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In	this	paper,	 the	patent	system	will	be	briefly	reviewed	and	some	particular	problems	in	designing	and	using	it	
will	be	considered	within	the	broad	framework	of	the	rela-
tionships	between	patent	 and	 innovation.	The	bulk	of	 the	
argument	 is	 that	 economists	 typically	 consider	 the	patent	
system	as	a	necessary	evil:	innovation	will	benefit	from	the	
incentive	 created	 by	 a	 patent	 but	 it	may	 suffer	 if	 patents	
discourage	 the	 combining	 and	 recombining	 of	 inventions	
to	 make	 new	 products	 and	 processes.	 Thus	 the	 relation-
ship	between	patents	and	innovation	is	guaranteed	to	be	a	
complex	one,	and	one	that	may	vary	over	time	and	across	
industries.
Part	 1	 deals	 with	 some	 simple	 economics	 of	 patents	
involving	analysis	of	the	basic	problem	to	be	solved	(imper-
fect	appropriability),	the	complexity	of	the	design	of	solu-
tions	to	that	problem,	since	more	than	one	thing	have	to	be	
done	at	the	same	time,	and	the	centrality	of	the	topography	
of	 technical	 advances	 as	 an	 important	 factor	 determining	
the	relation	between	patent	and	innovation.	Part	2	reviews	
the	 costs	 and	 the	 benefits	 as	well	 as	 the	 different	 classes	
of	effects	of	patent	on	the	creation,	development	and	com-
mercialization	of	new	or	improved	products	and	processes.	
Part	3	emphasizes	that	the	search	for	an	“optimal	design”	
of	the	patent	system	is	difficult.	There	are	strong	variations	
across	sectors	in	the	conditions,	procedures	and	impact	of	
innovation,	which	means	that	a	truly	uniform	system	treats	
“unlike	things”	alike	and	this	is	not	what	should	be	done	in	
a	“perfect	optimal	world”.	
While	this	paper	is	focusing	heavily	on	the	relationships	
between	patents	and	the	economics	of	innovation,	it	must	
be	clear	 that	 the	patent	 system	 is	only	one	option	among	
others,	 as	peculiar	ways	 to	 solve	 the	 tension	between	 the	
maximization	of	inventor’s	private	interests	and	the	socially	
optimal	 use	 of	 knowledge.	 The	 theoretical	 option	 taken	
by	most	 economists	 assumes	 the	 availability	 of	 different	
classes	of	institutions	which	have	been	designed	to	respond	
through	various	incentives	and	co-ordinations	mechanisms	
to	the	generic	problem	of	optimizing	the	production	and	use	
of	knowledge.	Economists	and	policy	makers	are	interested	
not	so	much	in	one	or	the	other	particular	mechanism	but	
in	the	design	of	“superior”	solutions	to	the	knowledge	trade	
off	–	given	the	social	value	of	the	knowledge	(is	it	an	essen-
tial	or	a	cumulative	knowledge)	and	the	characteristics	of	
the	market	(demand	elasticity,	size).
On the economic fundamentals  
of the patent system
imperfect appropriabiLity
The	 initial	 step	 in	 constructing	 a	 rationale	 in	 the	 domain	
of	patent	involves	the	classical	source	of	market	failures	as	
analysed	 in	Arrow	 (1962)	 and	 in	 the	 following	 literature.	
This	 approach	 focuses	 attention	 upon	 the	 special	 charac-
teristics	of	knowledge	as	an	economic	commodity,	which	
will	 be	 seen	 to	 affect	 its	 generation	 and	 distribution.	As	
Rockett	did	in	a	very	recent	survey	(2009),	let	do	an	intel-
lectual	 experiment	 (which	 actually	 has	 some	 historical	
precedents):	 no	 intellectual	 property	 right	 exist.	 Further,	
as	soon	as	an	innovative	product	is	sold	or	used,	a	variety	
of	individuals	become	familiar	with	the	invention,	creating	
the	seeds	for	imitation.	If	the	innovation	generates	profits,	
potential	imitators	are	attracted	to	the	innovation	to	produce	
their	own	version	of	it.	This	process	creates	a	variety	of	sup-
pliers	 of	 the	 innovative	product	 or	 process,	 driving	down	
its	price	and	so	the	profits	of	the	original	innovator.	If	the	
process	 is	quick	or	very	cheap,	 then	very	 little	 surplus	 is	
captured	by	the	initial	 innovator.	Any	innovator	anticipat-
ing	this	process	will	not	invest	in	the	innovation	in	the	first	
place.	 In	 essence,	 the	 innovator	 contributes	 to	 a	 common	
pool	of	knowledge	when	she	creates	and	practices	an	inno-
vation.	This	positive	externality,	if	it	is	not	captured	by	the	
inventor,	generates	a	private	under-incentive	to	innovate.	
The	foregoing	describes	what	has	come	to	be	referred	
to	as	the	“appropriability	problem,”	the	existence	of	which	
is	 invoked	 in	 the	mainstream	 economics	 literature	 as	 the	
primary	rationale	for	government	interventions	by	means	of	
various	policy	instruments.	The	patent	resolves	the	problem	
by	making	the	embodiment	of	the	innovation	a	private	good	
even	 though	 the	 underlying	 knowledge	 remains	 a	 public	
good.
Of	course	 the	 importance	of	 the	appropriability	prob-
lem	as	a	disincentive	to	innovate	and	the	resulting	private	
and	social	value	of	patents	as	a	mean	to	correct	the	problem	
need	some	qualification.	There	is	a	whole	series	of	phenom-
ena	 which,	 naturally	 or	 intentionally,	 lessen	 the	 problem	
(Foray,	2006).	
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quaLification of the argument: imperfect  
appropriabiLity does not appLy any time and  
everywhere and is not aLways a probLem
“Imperfect	appropriability”	theory	treats	only	one	extreme	
case,	knowledge,	expressed	 in	an	appropriate	form	for	 its	
diffusion	 (writing,	 computer	 programme,	 digital	 image,	
film).	But	a	knowledge	base	–	that	of	a	firm,	institution	or	
even	sector	–	is	not	reducible	to	pure	“codified”	knowledge.	
It	is	composed	of	tacit	knowledge,	know-how	and	practical	
experiences	as	well	as	research	materials,	instruments	and	
tools,	all	of	which	are	more	easily	controllable	goods.	Thus,	
very	few	research	results,	inventions	or	new	technological	
practices	are	formalized	from	the	start	to	the	point	of	being	
a	“simple”	set	of	codified	instructions	so	that	experiments	
and	results	can	be	reproduced	by	scrupulously	following	the	
codified	instructions	(in	the	way	that	anyone,	by	reading	the	
manual,	can	get	their	new	washing	machine	going).	When	
knowledge	 is	 expressed	 completely	 in	 this	 form	 of	 codi-
fied	instructions	(of	which	software	is	the	most	interesting	
example),	it	is	indeed	practically	impossible	to	control	it,	at	
least	in	the	community	of	specialists	and	practitioners	able	
to	understand	and	interpret	the	instructions.	In	reality,	how-
ever,	knowledge	and	results	are	far	more	often	presented	as	
a	combination	of	formalized	instructions	and	tacit	knowl-
edge,	based	on	practical	experiences	 that	can	be	acquired	
only	in	the	laboratory	where	the	discovery	was	made.	Thus,	
the	tacit	dimension	of	knowledge	affords	those	who	have	it	
a	degree	of	control,	since	only	voluntary	demonstration	and	
learning	on	site	allow	its	acquisition.
Hence,	there	is	a	sort	of	natural	excludability	that	this	
tacit	 dimension	bestows	on	knowledge.	This	 represents	 a	
transitory	source	of	intellectual	capital,	producing	rents	for	
the	innovators	who	have	the	know-how.	They	benefit	from	
it	until	 the	new	knowledge	is	sufficiently	codified,	articu-
lated,	clarified	and	hence	diffused	so	that	the	rents	dwindle	
away.	This	transitory	tacit	dimension	is	therefore	a	way	of	
controlling	 access	 to	 new	 knowledge,	 thereby	 lessening	
the	 appropriability	 problem.	 Imitation	 is	 a	 process	which	
is	costly	and	may	take	a	long	time.	On	this	base	being first 
in inventing a new knowledge may	be	sufficient	in	certain	
cases	to	capture	a	good	fraction	of	the	benefits.	In	fact	the	
supply	of	 copies	 cannot	 instantly	 undergo	 infinite	 expan-
sion.	Hence	the	fact	of	being	first	is	an	asset	that	can	com-
mand	a	positive	price	under	competitive	conditions.	
Another	 qualification	 of	 the	 argument	 of	 imperfect	
appropriability	relates	to	the	role	of	complementary	assets.	
Very	often	the	exploitation	of	new	knowledge	requires	spe-
cific	capacities	that	only	the	inventor	has,	such	as	techno-
logical	capacities	needed	to	implement	the	innovation	and	
to	manufactor	the	products	in	industrial	conditions.	Even	if	
the	idea	is	harnessed	by	others,	only	the	one	who	has	these	
capacities	 is	able	 to	exploit	 it.	Moreover,	 the	control	of	a	
particular	market	is	a	kind	of	complementary	asset	essen-
tial	to	the	exploitation	of	an	innovation.	In	all	these	cases,	
although	knowledge	can	be	imitated,	the	profits	associated	
with	its	implementation	remain	internal.
Finally,	 even	 if	 imperfect	 appropriability	 remains	 an	
important	 problem,	 other	 sources	 of	 profit	 for	 innovators	
than	the	monopoly	rent	can	undermine	the	severity	of	the	
problem,	(Hirshleifer,	1971).	By	definition,	innovators	are	
the	 only	 ones	 to	 have	 information	 on	 future	 changes	 in	
the	price	of	certain	inputs	that	their	innovation	is	likely	to	
cause.	Before	revealing	their	innovation,	they	are	therefore	
in	a	position	to	speculate	on	these	factors.	It	is	the	inven-
tor	of	a	water-mill	who	will	buy	cheaply	all	 land	through	
which	a	river	runs;	it	is	the	agent	who	discovers	the	use	of	
oil	who	pays	next-to-nothing	for	the	wasteland	polluted	by	
the	oil	fields.	
In	 all	 these	 cases	 the	 question	 of	maintaining	 control	
over	 innovation	 is	 no	 longer	 relevant;	 on	 the	 contrary.	
Imitation	and	diffusion	are	not	only	tolerable,	they	become	
highly	desirable.	Thus,	this	mechanism	makes	it	possible	to	
reconcile	in	the	best	possible	way	the	preservation	of	pri-
vate	interests	and	the	maximization	of	social	returns	(dis-
tribution	of	knowledge).	This	solution	shifts	the	source	of	
private	profits	and,	 as	 a	 result,	does	not	 affect	 innovation	
diffusion.	Better	still,	by	playing	on	effects	that	depend	on	
the	diffusion	of	the	innovation,	it	forces	the	creator	to	dis-
close	the	new	knowledge	freely.
designing incentives is difficuLt since two things have 
to be done in the same time
The	fact	remains	that	imperfect	appropriability	does	exist	in	
many	circumstances	and	that	patent	is	obviously	a	central	
mechanism	to	fix	the	problem.	However	an	important	issue	
for	 the	design	of	 instruments	 to	help	 to	correct	 imperfect	
appropriability	 is	 that	 helping	 innovators	 and	 knowledge	
producers	to	get	a	better	control	on	the	innovation	in	order	
to	 capture	 a	 significant	 fraction	 of	 the	 benefits	 stemming	
from	their	R&D	investments	and	creative	efforts	is	only	one	
part	of	the	policy	problem.	The	other	part	is	about	maximiz-
ing	 access	 and	 spillovers	 so	 that	 the	 society	will	 quickly	
benefit	from	the	new	knowledge	which	has	been	produced.	
There	 is	 something	 like	 a	 conflict	 of	 objectives	 which	
makes	the	design	of	policy	instruments	quite	complicated.
Broad	and	rapid	diffusion	of	new	and	“superior”	knowl-
edge	is	good	for	social	well-being.	It	is	quite	obvious	that	
efficiency	 and	 growth	 are	 promoted	 by	 the	 rapidity	with	
which	new	knowledge	and	new	technologies	are	dissemi-
nated:	 the	greater	 the	share	of	 individuals,	firms	or	coun-
tries	that	make	use	of	superior	products	and	processes	and	
the	sooner	they	do	so,	rather	than	being	confined	to	inferior	
substitutes,	the	more	widespread	and	substantial	the	growth	
benefits	should	be.
However,	we	know	also	that	rapid	dissemination	can	be	
the	enemy	of	innovation.	If	a	firm	undertakes	considerable	
expenditure	of	money	and	effort	to	carry	out	its	innovation	
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program,	but	finds	that	other	firms	rapidly	share	in	the	fruits,	
why	should	that	firm	devote	time,	effort	and	funding	to	con-
tinue	 that	program?	To	 summarize	 rapid	dissemination	 is	
good	for	social	well-being	but	bad	for	private	 returns:	no	
one	wants	to	invest	in	the	creation	of	new	knowledge	if	free	
sharing	 and	 dissemination	 occur	 rapidly.	This	 is	 the	 eco-
nomic	 (or	knowledge)	 trade	off	between	 the	need	 for	 the	
knowledge	producer	to	capture	some	of	the	benefits	asso-
ciated	with	 the	 economic	 use	 of	 the	 new	 knowledge	 and	
the	need	for	society	to	get	a	rapid	and	large	access	to	that	
knowledge.
There	is	a	technical	point	here	which	is	useful	to	make:	
the	production	of	knowledge	entails	very	often	high	fixed	
cost,	while	once	produced	 it	 is	available	at	zero	marginal	
cost.1	This	is	why,	in	a	static world,	when	the	new	knowl-
edge	has	been	invented,	there	is	no	point	to	ration	it	by	price	
since	the	knowledge	already	exists	and	cost	nothing	to	rep-
licate	(idea	of	“infinite	expansion”).	In	this	case,	if	charging	
for	 access	excludes	 some	would-be	consumers,	 the	 result	
is	waste.	Wants	go	unsatisfied	that	could	have	been	satis-
fied	 at	 no	 cost.	 However,	 in	 a	 dynamic world	 (in	 which	
knowledge	needs	to	be	produced),	the	knowledge	producers	
want	their	costs	to	be	covered	and	seek	for	economic	rents:	
marginal	 cost	 pricing	would	 leave	most	 costs	 uncovered,	
even	at	large	scales.	A	practical	way	to	reconcile	static and 
dynamic efficiencies	is	thus	to	find	mechanisms	that	allow	
knowledge	producers	to	capture	benefits	while	not	exclud-
ing	those	classes	of	consumers	that	need	access	and	use	at	
no	or	negligible	costs.	
This	is	why	it	is	important	to	devise	social	mechanisms	
to	allow	the	knowledge	producer	to	capture	(at	least)	a	frac-
tion	of	the	benefits	generated	by	the	invention.	But,	from	the	
point	of	view	of	society,	the	efficiency	of	these	mechanisms	
will	depend	on	the	kind	of	balance	which	is	built	between	
the	two	elements	of	the	trade	off:	providing	a	means	for	the	
knowledge	 producer	 to	 capture	 the	 benefits	 of	 his	 effort;	
maximizing	 the	 social	 dissemination	 of	 the	 knowledge.	
Institutions	that	govern	the	creation	and	diffusion	of	knowl-
edge	have	always	been	molded	by	this	so-called	knowledge 
trade-off.	They	will	be	assessed	according	to	the	way	they	
allow	for	an	efficient	management	of	this	trade	off.
patents: a mechanism devised “to do the two things”
Among	 these	 institutions,	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	
patents	 are	 of	 particular	 significance:	 patent	 is	 a	 legal	
device	which	is	generally	defined	as	a	right	to	exclude.	It	
ensures	inventors	the	right	to	a	temporary	monopoly	on	a	
technical	invention.	It	is	a	property	title	that	is	valid	in	time	
and	geographic	space.	It	is	obvious	that	the	patent	system	
per se	does	not	create	private	monopolies;	this	is	innovation	
which	allows	a	firm	to	get	a	unique	position	and	exit	some-
what	from	perfect	competition;	while	the	patent	system	just	
allows	the	firm	to	secure	this	position	(but	not	fully)	for	a	
certain	period	of	time.
Patent	 is	 one	 of	 the	 rights	 granted	 to	 the	 creators	 of	
intellectual	 products.	 Ideas	 are,	 of	 course,	 recognized	 as	
being	part	of	humanity’s	 common	base	and	 therefore	not	
appropriable	by	a	private	person.	 In	 this	 respect,	 they	are	
outside	 the	 law.	A	 literary	 subject,	 an	 artistic	principle,	 a	
political	idea,	or	a	scientific	vision,	for	example,	cannot	be	
monopolized.	What	can	however	tilt	over	into	private	prop-
erty	 is	 the	 concretization	 of	 the	 idea,	 theme	or	 principle.	
Only	then	may	it	be	the	object	of	a	private	right.
In	exchange	for	patent	rights	the	inventor	must	publicly	
divulge	 the	 technical	 details	 on	 the	 invention.	This	 is	 the	
typical	response	of	the	patent	system	to	the	knowledge	trade	
off.	The	public	availability	of	the	technical	description	is	an	
essential	element.	It	is	the	basis	of	the	balance	between	the	
inventor’s	interest	and	those	of	society.	This	does	not	mean	
that	 other	 people	 can	 use	 the	 knowledge	 which	 is	 made	
publicly	 available	 through	 a	 patent	 application.	 It	 means	
rather	that	the	patent	system	facilitates	“the	show”,	contrib-
utes	to	make	the	knowledge	visible,	support	informational	
spillovers.	Before	its	creation	in	the	16th	century,	inventors	
were	hostile	to	the	idea	of	revealing	new	knowledge.
designing incentives for what?
It	is	a	frequent	misperception	that	the	policy	purpose	of	pat-
ents	is	primarily	to	reward	and	thereby	encourage	invention,	
defined	as	the	initial	creation	of	an	idea	for	a	new	product	or	
process.	Based	on	this	misperception,	some	argue	that	pat-
ents	are	not	necessary,	because	creativity	is	inherent	in	the	
human	spirit,	and	new	ideas	are	all	around	us.	Patent’s	ene-
mies	are	quick	to	extract	the	names	of	Leonardo,	Gutenberg	
or	Michelangelo	from	the	history	of	art	to	make	their	case	
that	patent	is	not	indispensable	to	boost	creativity!
But	 the	 economic	 function	 of	 patents	 is	 not	 just	 to	
reward	 invention,	but	 to	provide	a	 secure	economic	envi-
ronment	 for	 the	 investment	 that	 converts	 ideas	 in	 reality	
(Jaffe,	2005).	This	“D”	part	of	R&D	 is	expensive,	 and	 is	
often	carried	out	most	effectively	in	the	private	sector.	Thus	
fostering	 the	 investment	 in	 development	 is	 a	 key	 policy	
problem.	Patents	are	not	 the	only	mechanism	for	protect-
ing	and	thereby	encouraging	this	 investment,	but	 they	are	
important	one.	They	are	particularly	important	for	start	up	
firms	dependent	on	external	finance,	and	for	inventions	that	
must	be	transferred	or	licensed	from	one	firm	to	another	in	
order	to	make	the	transition	to	the	commercialization	phase.	
1.	 The	 fact	 that	 marginal	 cost	 of	 reproduction	 is	 zero	 is	 essentially	
due	to	the	fact	that	knowledge,	once	produced,	is	not	destroyed	by	use	
and	 consumption.	 Its	 benefits	 can	 be	 enjoyed	 undiminished	 by	many	
users	 concurrently	 as	 well	 as	 sequentially.	 However,	 the	 proposition	
“knowledge	is	available	at	zero	marginal	costs”	does	not	imply	anything	
about	the	cost	of	using	the	knowledge.	Very	often	knowledge	is	usable	
together	with	resources	available	only	at	positive,	and	often	very	high	
cost.	 For	 example,	 to	 be	 used	 effectively	 knowledge	 needs	 educated	
people.
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the unanticipated effects of patents on innovation in 
“compLex technoLogy” situations
Patent	 is	 likely	 to	encourage	 innovation	 (above).	But	 this	
relation	 is	 not	 so	 simple;	 it	 is	 depending	on	 the	 topogra-
phy	of	technical	advance	in	a	field,	in	particular	how	inven-
tions	are	 linked	 to	each	other,	 and	 in	 the	extent	 to	which	
rapid	 technical	 advance	 requires	a	diversity	of	actors	and	
minds.	We	can	differentiate	two	cases	in	which	the	relation	
between	patent	and	innovation	is	likely	to	lead	to	unantici-
pated	situations	(such	as	heavy	transaction	costs	and	even	
innovation	blockage)	(Merges	and	Nelson,	1994).
By cumulative technology	legal	and	economic	schol-
ars	mean	one	 in	which	 today’s	advances	 lay	 the	basis	for	
tomorrow’s,	which	 in	 turn	 lay	 the	basis	 for	a	next	 round,	
etc..Innovative	 cumulativeness	 has	 implications	 both	 for	
the	social	value	of	discoveries	and	for	the	ease	with	which	
firms	 can	 be	 given	 incentives	 to	 create	 them.	 The	 social	
value	of	 an	 invention	 is	 compounded	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
discovery	facilitates	or	becomes	a	basis	for	future	discover-
ies.	However,	cumulativeness	makes	it	especially	difficult	
to	 turn	social	value	 into	private	value,	as	must	be	done	if	
firms	will	 have	 incentive	 to	 innovate.	This	 is	 particularly	
true	when	future	innovations	are	improved	versions	of	pre-
vious	 innovations.	Later	products	can	supplant	 the	earlier	
products	 in	 the	market,	 thus	 terminating	 the	 profitability	
of	 the	 products	 that	 facilitated	 them.	 In	 that	 case,	 there	
may	be	 too	 little	 incentive	 to	provide	 the	earlier	products	
(Scotchmer,	1991).
By system’s technology,	 scholars	mean	a	 technology	
in	which	a	useful	product	is	made	out	of	different	compo-
nents,	each	of	which	might	be	invented	independently.	But	
if	a	patent	on	one	component	that	is	key	to	a	variety	of	sys-
tems	 is	defined	broadly,	 the	holder	of	 that	patent	may	be	
able	 to	block	others	 from	commercializing	 those	 systems	
without	 license.	On	 the	other	 hand	 the	holder	 of	 a	 broad	
patent	on	another	essential	component	may	be	able	to	block	
the	holder	of	the	former	patent	from	building	a	state	of	the	
art	system.
One	of	 the	main	 themes	 to	 emerge	 is	 that	firms	have	
powerful	economic	incentives	to	resolve	this	kind	of	con-
flicts	 in	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 caused	 by	 the	 com-
plexity	 of	 relationships	 between	 patent	 and	 cumulative	
or	 system’s	 technologies	 through	 contracting,	 either	with	
research	 joint	 ventures	 or	 licensing.	 Cross-licensing	 and	
pooling	 arrangements	 become	 central	 for	 achieving	 the	
coordination	of	inventive	activities	among	a	large	number	
of	owners	of	items	of	intellectual	property,	in	very	complex	
technological	environment.
On costs, benefits and different classes of effects: 
theory and empirical evidence
costs and benefits (private and sociaL point of views)
The	 patent	 system	 has	many	 virtues.	The	most	 visible	 is	
in	 its	main	role	which	 is	 to	provide	an	 incentive	(an	eco-
nomic	 motivation)	 to	 future	 inventors.	 Patent	 is	 a	 legal	
device	which	is	generally	defined	as	a	right	to	exclude.	It	
ensures	inventors	the	right	to	a	temporary	“monopoly”	on	
a	 technical	 invention	 for	a	certain	period	of	 time.	During	
such	 period,	 the	 innovator	 will	 recover	 R&D	 fixed	 costs	
by	charging	a	price	above	marginal	cost	(which	is	what	a	
monopolist	can	do).
It	facilitates	the	market	test	of	new	inventions	because	
it	allows	disclosure	of	related	information	while	protecting	
against	imitation.	
Patents	create	transferable	rights	and	can	therefore	help	
to	structure	complex	market	 transactions	on	technologies.	
Patents	are	an	essential	element	of	the	legal	infrastructure	
of	the	markets	for	technologies	that	are	in	certain	industries	
a	source	of	great	efficiency	(see	below).	
Patents	are	a	means	to	signal	and	assess	the	future	value	
of	the	technological	efforts	of	young	companies	for	which	
other	 classes	 of	 “intangibles”	 cannot	 be	 used	 for	 proper	
evaluation.
Finally	 the	patent	 system	as	a	 reward	mechanism	has	
some	virtue	in	terms	of	the	whole	management	of	the	sys-
tem	 (contrasting	 for	 instance	 with	 a	 prize-based	 mecha-
nism):	the	value	of	invention	is	determined	ex post,	through	
market	processes;	the	cost	of	the	system	is	mainly	borne	by	
consumers	instead	of	taxpayers.
However,	 by	 imposing	 exclusive	 rights,	 the	 patent	
restricts	de	facto	the	use	of	knowledge	and	its	exploitation	
by	those	who	might	have	benefited	from	it	had	it	been	free.	
This	is	a	case	for	social	inefficiency	(recall	that	in	a	static 
world	knowledge	once	produced	is	available	at	0	marginal	
cost).	 In	 this	 case,	 if	 charging	 for	 access	 excludes	 some	
would-be	consumers,	the	result	is	waste.	Wants	go	unsatis-
fied	that	could	have	been	satisfied	at	no	cost.	The	example	of	
AIDS	drugs	illustrates	this	point:	AIDS	drugs	are	relatively	
inexpensive	to	produce.	They	are	sufficiently	inexpensive	to	
produce,	that	the	benefits	to	in	lives	saved	exceed	the	costs	
of	producing	the	drugs	by	orders	of	magnitude.	But	because	
of	patents,	no	price	competition	is	permitted	and	the	patent	
holders	(the	large	pharmaceutical	companies)	charge	such	
an	enormous	premium	over	the	cost	of	producing	the	drugs	
–	 to	 reap	 large	 profits	 from	 sales	 in	 rich	 countries	 –	 that	
individuals	in	many	countries	cannot	afford	them.	Here	is	
an	example	where	 the	overpricing	has	 real	and	enormous	
social	costs.	However,	as	already	said,	in	a	dynamic world	
(in	which	knowledge	needs	to	be	produced),	the	knowledge	
producers	want	their	costs	to	be	covered	and	seek	for	cap-
turing	the	economic	rents	they	have	produced.	This	is	for	
what	the	patent	system	has	been	designed.
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Some	other	shortcomings	of	the	system	are	caused	sim-
ply	by	inappropriate	modes	of	use	of	patents,	from	a	social	
point	of	view.	A	case	in	point	is	the	so	called	“strategic	use”	
of	patents	by	firms.	Some	firms	use	them	as	bargaining	chips	
in	cross-licensing	agreements.	Such	strategic	use	has	little	
to	do	with	protecting	innovation	while	increasing	asymmet-
ric	powers	 in	bargaining	and	negotiation	between	 the	big	
and	the	small	players.	There	is	now	strong	evidence	that	in	
some	 industries	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 patent	 applica-
tions	is	explained	not	by	the	need	to	protect	more	innova-
tions	but	by	 some	 strategic	use	purposes	 (Hall,	 2003).	 In	
this	respect	many	shortcomings	in	the	patent	system	are	not	
inevitable,	for	they	are	not	intrinsically	associated	with	the	
concept	of	intellectual	property	but	result	from	a	mode	of	
use	that	leads	to	blockages	or	slows	down	innovation.	(see	
below	paragraph	2).
Given	 both	 advantages	 and	 shortcomings,	 the	 pat-
ent	 system	 has	 often	 been	 qualified	 as	 a	 “necessary ill”.	
Economists	agree	that	the	patent	system	is	a	good	thing	for	
innovation	and	growth,	provided	the	negative	effects	on	the	
economy	are	reduced;	and	particularly	 the	negative	effect	
on	 the	 diffusion	 and	 large	 use	 of	 the	 knowledge.	 In	 this	
respect,	the	challenge	is	in	the	“design”	of	the	device	(and	
may	be	this	design	should	vary	across	sectors,	see	below)	
as	well	as	in	the	enforceability	of	simple	rules	which	can	
help	to	minimize	the	negative	effects.	These	rules	are	quite	
obvious	 and	 well-known.	 However,	 they	 were	 ill-treated	
and	 ill-used	 during	 the	 most	 recent	 period:	 the	 require-
ment	of	a	technical	description	of	the	invention	to	maintain	
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Box 1 : Economic effects of patent under static 
conditions
Figure	1	shows	the	demand	for	a	newly	marketed	
product	(the	solid	line	D).	In	the	absence	of	patent	pro-
tection,	 innovations	 are	 freely	 available	 so	 that	 price	
is	equal	to	marginal	cost	and	output	is	Qc.	When	the	
inventor	is	granting	a	patent	and	prices	the	innovation	
to	maximize	his	profit,	the	price	is	Pm	and	output	falls	
to	Qm.	The	triangle	D	represents	the	welfare	loss	con-
sumers	associated	with	introducing	product	patents.
On	the	other	hand,	the	most	obvious	dynamic	gains	
is	the	inventor’s	profit,	the	square	marked	P.
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a	fair	balance	between	the	inventor’s	private	interests	and	
the	 interest	 of	 society;	 the	 exclusion	 of	 science	 from	 the	
domain	of	patentability	through	criteria	of	industrial	appli-
cation	(or	utility);	an	accurate	application	of	the	criterion	of	
inventive	activity	and	inventive	step	 to	clearly	delimit	 the	
area	of	human	activity	and	identify	the	degrees	of	innova-
tiveness	which	are	required	to	be	appropriated	by	a	patent.
patent excess in the knowLedge economy and the new 
questions raised by economists
The	 concern	 just	mentioned	 deals	with	 some	 inappropri-
ate	modes	of	use	of	patents,	 from	a	 social	point	of	view.	
A	case	 in	point	 is	 the	so	called	“strategic	use”	of	patents	
by	firms.	This	is	the	situation	in	which	the	various	leaders	
of	an	industry	each	hold	an	IP	portfolio,	much	of	which	is	
regularly	infringed	by	competitors.	As	Barton	(2007)	points	
out,	none	of	the	firms	usually	brings	suit	on	those	patents,	
because	 each	 knows	 that	 the	 defendant	 would	 respond	
with	a	counterattack	based	on	those	of	the	defendant’s	pat-
ents	 that	 it	 itself	 is	 infringing.	Litigation	is	 too	much	like	
a	nuclear	weapon,	and	the	relation	becomes	one	mutually	
assured	destruction!	Each	firm	must	therefore	maintain	an	
IP	 portfolio	 for	 bargaining-chip,	 i.e.	 defensive,	 purposes.	
But,	 and	 here	 is	 the	 point	 important	 for	 innovation	 and	
industrial	dynamics,	there	is	no	reason	not	to	use	the	port-
folio	against	possible	new	entrants	who	might	affect	the	oli-
gopoly	rents	available	to	the	incumbents,	and,	therefore,	as	
a	tool	to	block	innovation.	This	is	the	most	typical	actual	use	
of	patents,	notably	in	the	semi-conductor	industry,	financial	
services	or	 agricultural	biotechnology.	This	pattern	 arises	
frequently	 in	oligopolistic	context.	Such	strategic	use	has	
little	 to	 do	 with	 protecting	 innovation	 while	 increasing	
asymmetric	powers	in	bargaining	and	negotiation	between	
the	big	and	the	small	players:	“I just don’t know what is in 
my portfolio of 8000 patents”	 is	a	good	quotation	 from	a	
Chief	R&D	Officer	of	a	large	and	well	known	company	that	
illustrates	the	magnitude	of	the	problem.	As	a	result	many	
industries	and	technological	fields	are	now	characterized	by	
the	formation	of	patent	thickets	–	an	expression	describing	
the	proliferation	of	overlapping	and	not	clearly	delineated	
patents.	Efforts	and	costs	devoted	to	sorting	out	conflicting	
and	overlapping	claims	to	IPR	are	increasing,	as	is	uncer-
tainty	about	the	nature	and	extent	of	legal	liability	in	using	
knowledge	inputs.	It	is	also	possible	that	intellectual	prop-
erty-related	transaction	costs	may	increase	so	much	that	the	
result	can	be	 the	deadlock	of	knowledge	exploitation	and	
accumulation	(anti-commons).
It	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 the	 new	 situation	 involving	 inten-
sive	 patenting	 activities,	 large	 amount	 of	 cross-licensing,	
aggressive	patent	enforcement	strategies	and	privatization	
of	some	basic	research	activities	is	better	than	the	preceding	
one	that	was	characterized	by	a	moderate	level	of	patenting	
activities,	firms	allowing	diffusion	of	their	own	knowledge	
in	return	for	low	cost	absorption	of	other’s	knowledge,	and	
a	 large	 public	 research	 domain.	The	 latter	 seems	 to	 be	 a	
system	with	lower	transaction	costs	and	lower	risk	of	seing	
some	innovative	projects	to	be	blocked	by	patent	thickets,	
while	the	former	does	not	seem	distinctly	superior	in	terms	
of	knowledge	production.
What	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 is	 that	 it	 is	 (was?)	
relatively	 easy	 to	 get	 a	 large	 number	 of	 patents	 granted	
or	patents	 including	a	high	number	of	claims	while	 these	
applications	 do	 not	 strictly	 aim	 at	 protecting	 correspond-
ing	 innovations.	Such	easiness	 is	explained	by	 the	modes	
of	operation	of	patent	offices,	the	mere	fact	that	the	patent	
criteria	(novelty,	inventive	steps,	utility)	are	far	from	being	
unambiguous	and	perfectly	clear	and	the	fact	that	for	large	
companies	the	marginal	costs	of	patent	application	and	of	
patent	renewal	are	negligible.	If	a	firm	wants	to	conduct	a	
strategic	use	of	patent,	basically	it	can	do	it.
In	sum,	recent	trends	toward	i)	strategic	use,	ii)	patents	
moving	up	to	the	domains	of	scientific	research	(research	
tools)	and	iii)	the	broadening	of	the	possible	subject	matters	
(business	methods,	software,	living	organisms)	which	leads	
to	some	weakening	of	the	basic	rules;	all	these	trends	cause	
economists	questioning	more	deeply	the	ways	patents	are	
granted	 and	 the	 role	 of	 economic	 incentives	 as	 shaping	
behaviors	and	strategies	both	of	the	private	innovators	and	
of	the	patent	office.	Such	questions	became	quite	central	as	
economists	 started	 to	 clearly	 see	 that	 some	other	mecha-
nisms	may	do	a	better	 job,	supporting	innovation	without	
creating	 exclusivity	 and	monopoly.	 For	 instance,	 we	 can	
observe	the	current	booming	of	some	social	systems	–	such	
as	 “open-source”	 and	 “open	 collaborative	 research”	 -	 in	
which	high	rates	of	innovation	are	correlated	with	rich	and	
instantaneous	free	revealing	pattern,	 implying	that	private	
inventors	do	not	always	rely	on	exclusivity	and	excludabil-
ity	mechanisms	 to	 capture	 the	 private	 benefits	 from	 their	
intellectual	creative	work.
The	good	news	is	 that	 these	problems	are	not	inevita-
ble,	for	they	are	not	intrinsically	associated	to	the	idea	of	
allocating	intellectual	property	right	but	they	are	the	result	
from	 some	 economic	 and	 strategic	 behaviors	 that	 can	 be	
controlled	or	the	pure	manifestation	of	a	transition	period	
in	which	patent	officers	have	to	learn	how	to	deal	with	new	
subject	matters.	For	instance,	Cockburn	(2002)	shows	that	
out	of	some	5500	patents	in	class	705	of	USPTO	(business	
methods),	more	than	2700	cited	no	prior	art	and	were	char-
acterized	 by	 lax	 standards	 for	 enablement	 and	 disclosure	
(something	like	a	shift	from	literal	description	in	rigourous	
terms	as	“direction	of	use”	which	allows	for	effective	repro-
duction	of	 the	 invention	 to	a	vague	communication	of	an	
idea).	However,	it	may	be	the	case	that	the	weakening	of	the	
basic	rules	can	be	traced	to	poor	application	of	patent	prin-
ciples	not	a	fundamental	inapplicability	of	these	principles.	
Problems	in	new	fields	are	mainly	transitory	dealing	with	
the	fact	that	there	is	a	time	lag	between	the	emergence	of	
new	classes	of	subject	matter	and	the	kind	of	experimental	
learning	that	must	occur	in	patent	offices	about	proper	treat-
ment	 of	 applications	 in	 the	 new	fields.	As	Barton	 (2007)	
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argues	 now,	 many	 very	 recent	 evolutions,	 although	 not	
changing	dramatically	the	current	state	of	affair,	suggest	the	
pendulum	of	IP	may	be	beginning	to	swing	back,	at	least	at	
the	US	level.
patent, innovation and competition
We	 already	 stated	 that	 without	 intellectual	 property	 pro-
tection,	potential	innovators	would	be	afraid	that	competi-
tors	would	copy	(competition	by	imitation)	and,	therefore,	
would	not	invest	in	R&D.	But	conversely,	without	competi-
tion,	the	monopolist	who	holds	intellectual	property	rights	
would	not	have	any	incentive	to	invest	further	in	innovative	
activities	since	this	firm	would	already	control	the	market	
and	would	be	able	 to	 impose	monopoly	prices.	Therefore	
both	 causal	 chains	 –	 patent stimulates innovation and 
competition stimulates innovation	-	need	to	be	adequately	
combined	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 dynamic	 competition.	As	
a	consequence,	 the	patent	 law	 itself	 is	 in	need	of	a	“pro-
competitive”	 design:	 in	 terms	 of	 competition,	 the	 patent	
system	excludes	a	certain	type	of	competition	which	is	the	
competition	by	copying	(usually	defined	as	a	competition	
on	prices)	but	should	not	exclude	another	type	of	competi-
tion	which	is	a	competition	by	substitution	(or	innovation).	
Market	access	with	better	products	should	always	be	pos-
sible.	By	impeding	competition	through	imitation,	the	pat-
ent	system	allows	the	innovator	to	profit	from	a	monopoly	
position	within	a	certain	period	of	time.	
This	 inter-relationship	between	 innovation,	patent	and	
competition	needs	some	qualifications.	First,	the	effect	on	
competition	is	particularly	positive	as	far	as	entry	and	new	
firms	are	concerned:	 the	patent	system	facilitates	entry	of	
new	 firms	 with	 limited	 assets.	 Second,	 a	 negative	 effect	
is	 that	 the	 short	 term	 monopolies	 which	 are	 created	 by	
innovation	and	patents	may	become	long	term	in	network	
industries.
a new function of an increasing reLevance: 
Lubricating markets for technoLogy and supporting 
verticaL speciaLization
Patents	play	a	central	role	in	sustaining	a	particular	indus-
try	structure	–	vertical	specialization	–	which	proves	to	be	
an	effective	way	to	boost	innovation.	The	argument	is	the	
following:
Well-enforced	 patents	 raise	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	
small	 firms	 that	 develop	 and	 supply	 technological	 solu-
tions.	Assimetry	in	size	and	bargaining	power	are	common	
in	 transactions	 between	 small	 technology	 specialists	 and	
downstream	 product	 developers.	 Problems	 arise	 because	
the	small	technology	suppliers	have	no	means	to	appropri-
ate	the	rents	from	their	innovations	other	than	a	legal	stake	
on	 these	 innovations.	Weak	or	no	patent	would	have	 two	
consequences:	 the	 technology	 supplier	 may	 try	 to	 inte-
grate	downstream	to	secure	 the	rent	on	their	 technologies	
by	embodying	them	in	the	final	product;or	they	exit	from	
the	activity.	In	both	case,	the	division	of	labor	is	weakened	
because	 either	 the	 small	 company	 becomes	 an	 integrated	
firm	 itself	 or	 the	 product	 developers	 have	 to	 integrate	
upstream	to	compensate	the	lack	of	supply	by	independent	
suppliers.
This	is,	in	any	case,	an	unfortunate	consequence	because	
this	structure	exhibits	many	virtues	regarding	creativity	and	
innovation:
–	 efficiency	gains	from	specialization:	cost	effectiveness,	
speed
–	 high	powered	incentives:	rewards	are	more	closely	tied	
to	the	profits	of	each	party’s	efforts
–	 if	new	knowledge	and	ideas	are	generated	inside	verti-
cally	integrated	firms	and	held	as	trade	secrets,	knowl-
edge	spillovers	and	social	returns	are	likely	to	be	lower	
than	if	they	are	disclosed	in	patent	applications	by	small	
vertically	disintegrated	technology	suppliers.	
The	argument	here	is	not	that	patent	has	a	direct	effect	
on	creativity;	but	being	instrumental	in	organizing	and	sus-
taining	a	certain	industry	structure,	which	is	good	for	inno-
vation,	it	has	an	indirect	positive	impact	on	innovation	and	
creativity:	patents	play	a	positive	role	in	enhancing	industry	
R&D	efficiency	 by	 fostering	 the	 emergence	 and	 entry	 of	
specialized	technology-services	or	research	firms.
summary on costs, benefits and reaL effects
The	main	effect	is	that	patent	creates	an	incentive	for	R&D;	
this	is	for	that	purpose	that	it	has	been	“invented”.	However,	
evidence	 is	mixed,	 which	 basically	means	 that	 empirical	
and	theoretical	research	has	not	proved	any	automatic	and	
stable	model	or	formula	that	could	be	used	to	predict	that	
any	strengthening	of	a	patent	system	will	result	in	such	an	
increase	 in	 the	 quantity	 of	 resources	 allocated	 to	 innova-
tive	 activities.	The	mixed	 evidence	means	 also	 that	 there	
are	 strong	 variations	 across	 sectors:	 patents	may	 provide	
incentives	for	innovation	in	certain	industries;	but	in	most	
industries	 patents	 are	 less	 important	 than	 other	 mecha-
nisms	such	as	first	mover	advantage	and	commercialization	
capabilities.
The	first	order	benefit	of	patent	may	be	 in	 lubricating	
the	market	 for	 technology	 and	 encouraging	 a	 division	 of	
labor	in	innovative	activities.	
The	major	cost	is	about	access:	monopoly	pricing	gen-
erates	static	inefficiency.	It	may	impede	the	combination	of	
new	ideas	and	inventions	and	raises	transaction	costs.
In	terms	of	competition,	patent	facilitates	entry	of	new	
firms	with	limited	assets	but	create	short	term	monopolies	
which	may	become	long	term	in	network	industries.
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Many	of	 the	 problems	 caused	 by	 patents	 are	 because	
patents	 are	 poorly	 written,	 inlegalese,	 to	 claim	 as	 much	
while	disclosing	as	little.
Patent design: one size does not fit all
A	lot	of	evidence	demonstrates	that	patents	are	doing	good	
in	some	sectors	but	they	also	doing	harm	in	others.	When	
looking	at	surveys	about	industry	manager’s	perception	of	
the	 usefulness	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 patent	 system	 as	
a	mean	 to	 appropriate	 innovation	 benefits,	we	 see	 strong	
variations	ranging	from	the	case	of	pharmaceuticals	using	
the	system	in	a	very	enthusiastic	way	to	a	more	qualified	
appreciation	 in	 biotechnology,	 to	 the	mixed	 views	 of	 the	
computer	 and	 semi-conductor	 industries	 to	 the	 somewhat	
negative	views	of	software	developers	and	Internet	services.	
Beyond	 surveys,	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 optimal	
breath	and	length	is	making	the	same	argument:	 the	opti-
mal	length	of	patent	life	can	hardly	be	uniform	across	the	
whole	range	of	industries	and	inventions,	inasmuch	as	it	is	
sensitive	to	the	price	elasticity	of	demand	in	the	related	end-
product	market,	and	to	the	responsiveness	of	the	production	
costs	of	the	new	product	to	the	amount	of	resources	devoted	
to	R&D.
So	innovation	and	the	relationships	of	patents	to	inno-
vation	differ	by	industry.	One	size	does	not	fit	all;	a	truly	
unitary	 patent	 law	 would	 therefore	 treat	 “unlike	 things”	
alike.
Should	we	think	of	and	go	for	a	system	which	would	
be	more	technology-specific;	prescribing	explicit	rules	for	
specific	fields?	Should	we	acknowledge	that	specific	indus-
tries	 have	 specialized	 patent	 needs	 and	 taylor	 the	 system	
accordingly?
While	it	is	relatively	easy	for	economic	theory	to	show	
that	optimal	design	should	differ	significantly	across	tech-
nologies	and	industries,	a	strong	case	can	be	made	that	this	
is	a	Pandora	box	that	should	not	be	opened.
optimaL design impLies patent LegisLation 
differentiation….
Patent	is	a	tool	to	support	of	innovation;	but	the	conditions,	
procedures	and	modes	of	innovation	differ	strongly	across	
sectors.	Many	dimensions	of	innovation	are	concerned	with	
sectoral	variations	(Kahin,	2007):	discrete	versus	complex	
products;	cost	of	invention	and	commercialization;	pace	of	
innovation	 and	 cumulativeness;	 public	 good	 characteris-
tics;	 network	 characteristics;	 transaction	 costs.	One	obvi-
ous	response	to	these	variations	from	sector	to	sector	is	to	
explicitly	 legislate	 different	 patent	 standard	 for	 different	
industries	 to	 supplement	 patent	 protection	 in	 some	 fields	
with	a	suis generis	status.	The	economic	effects	of	patents	
are	quite	 different	 in	 software	 and	biotechnology;	 two	of	
the	 industries	 in	which	 the	 call	 for	 specific	 legislation	 is	
loudest.	Thus,	in	a	perfect	“optimizable”	world	the	patent	
system	might	well	be	tailored	to	give	optimal	incentives	to	
each	different	industries.	
…which wiLL put the entire system at risk
However,	 it	 is	 relatively	 easy	 to	 argue	 that	 some	 kind	 of	
fine	 tuning	 according	 to	 technological	 heterogeneity	will	
ultimately	 fail	 and	 will	 likely	 to	 weaken	 the	 system.	 Of	
course,	as	mentioned	above,	the	theory	can	identify	certain	
features	of	technology	that	make	strong	or	long	patent	less	
desirable;	however	it	might	be	extremely	difficult	to	iden-
tify	these	features	in	particular	 technologies;	more	a	mat-
ter	of	degree	than	of	clear	categories.	Even	if	one	could	in	
principle	restrict	the	applicability	of	patents	based	on	such	
analysis	of	intrinsic	technological	principles;	it	is	likely	that	
–	 in	practice	–	 such	efforts	would	 fail.	Drafters	of	patent	
application	will	always	be	more	ingenious	than	the	writers	
of	patent	rules.	So	prescribing	patent	protection	for	certain	
technologies	 will	 simply	 drive	 applications	 to	 be	written	
so	that	they	appear	in	other,	more	favourable,	classes.	Also	
such	 a	 policy	 process	 toward	 more	 technology	 specific	
system	will	never	avoid	 lobbyist	 from	different	 industries	
seeking	for	special	treatments.
activating poLicy Levers…
One	argument,	developed	by	Burk	and	Lemley	(among	oth-
ers),	is	that	despite	the	appearance	of	uniformity,	patent	law	
are	 diversified.	There	 is	 enough	 flexibility	 already	 in	 the	
system	to	cope	with	diversity	of	situations.	The	idea	is	that	
patent	laws	give	the	courts	and	offices	substantial	freedom	
to	adjust	general	rules	to	specific	cases	by	means	of	flexible	
legal	standards,	called	policy	levers.	The	key	issue	for	the	
patent	offices	and	authorities	 is	 to	 learn	how	to	use	 these	
policy	levers	and	to	be	incentivized	to	do	so.
According	 to	 Burk	 and	 Lemley	 (2009),	 policy	 levers	
are	legal	principles	that	can	be	applied	with	sensivity	to	the	
industry	and	the	factual	context	of	 the	cases.	They	differ-
entiate	between	policy	levers	that	expressly	treat	different	
industries	 differently	 and	 those	 that	 treat	 different	 inven-
tions	differently	without	explicit	 regard	 to	 industries.	The	
exclusion	 of	 abstract	 ideas	 from	 patentability	 or	 the	 use	
of	 the	utility	doctrine	 in	 the	US	are	examples	of	existing	
policy	 levers.	New	doctrines	 could	 in	 the	 future	 serve	 as	
policy	levers.	For	example	a	fortified	right	to	experimental	
use	could	be	valuable	for	industries	like	software	where	it	is	
difficult	to	design	around	a	patented	product	without	repro-
ducing	 the	 product.	A	 new	 type	 of	 patentability	 inquiry	
could	assess	whether	innovation	in	a	particular	industry	is	
highly	costly	and	risky,	in	which	case	a	lower	incentive	step	
or	a	more	liberal	disclosure	standard	might	be	merited.
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…and buiLding economic insight within the system
The	challenges	 for	courts	and	offices	are	huge.	Some	 (or	
many)	have	to	move	from	poor	practices	to	an	effective	use	
of	the	policy	levers	(Hunt	and	Kahin,	2008).	Policy	levers	
are	policy	tools	that	need	to	be	properly	understood	as	legal	
principles	that	can	be	applied	with	sensitivity	to	the	indus-
try	and	factual	context	of	the	cases.	And	so	the	challenges	
for	 the	 offices	 and	 courts	 is	 to	 understand	 deeply	 condi-
tions,	procedures	and	the	economic	logic	of	innovation	in	
each	industry	and	the	potential	effect	of	using	one	lever	in	
a	specific	case.
As	 a	 conclusion	 the	 problem	 is	where	 insights	 about	
innovation	economics	should	be	built	into	the	system,	since	
understanding	 what	 policy	 lever	 should	 be	 used	 in	 what	
circumstances	 is	about	economics	of	 innovation.	There	 is	
obviously	 an	 issue	 of	 capacities	 and	 knowledge	 as	 well	
as	of	incentives.	There	are	a	lot	of	reasons	for	offices	and	
courts	to	wash	their	hands	of	involvements	in	policy	cali-
bration	and	fine	tuning.	To	their	credits,	a	number	of	offices	
have	recruited	chief	economists,	a	step	that	is	long	overdue.	
Finally	 the	 case	 is	 even	 stronger	 for	 the	patent	 offices	 in	
the	less	developed	countries	to	build	economic	knowledge	
in	order	to	use	properly	and	effectively	the	policy	levers	to	
serve	the	innovation	needs	of	their	countries.	
Conclusion: Patent and the search for the design 
of “superior” solutions to support knowledge 
access and production
How	the	knowledge	trade	off	should	be	solved	(and	so	what	
kind	 of	 mechanism	 should	 be	 used)	 depends	 obviously	
of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 knowledge	 and	 the	 characteristics	 of	
the	economic	environment.	For	example,	if	the	issue	to	be	
addressed	is	to	encourage	invention	of	vaccines	for	tropical	
diseases,	there	are	two	arguments	for	not	using	the	patent	
system	to	encourage	innovation	and	for	developing,	rather,	
a	kind	of	prize-based	or	optimal	procurement	mechanism:	
first	companies	know	that	poor	countries	will	not	afford	to	
buy	the	new	product	at	a	monopoly	price	and	therefore	the	
private	rationale	to	use	patent	 is	weakened	(or	companies	
anticipate	that	they	will	be	forced	to	sell	the	product	at	some	
lower	price	and	again	the	economic	motivation	to	undertake	
the	research	will	be	undermined);	second,	the	access	to	the	
new	knowledge	will	be	so	vital	 that	creating	a	monopoly	
would	generate	very	high	social	costs	and	inefficiencies.
Economists	 and	 policy	 makers	 are	 interested	 not	 so	
much	in	a	particular	mechanism	but	in	the	design	of	“supe-
rior”	solutions	to	the	knowledge	trade	off.	This	is	certainly	
the	most	interesting	policy	question:	what	is	the	right	mech-
anism	for	a	socially	efficient	solution	to	the	appropriability	
problem?	Helping	the	market	 to	 invent	a	new	vaccine,	an	
orphan	drug,	a	new	encryption	method	or	a	new	environ-
mental	technology	involves	the	design	and	deployment	of	
different	classes	of	solutions.	From	this	field	of	questions,	
patent	certainly	emerges	as	a	vital	institution	for	technology	
policy.	Its	efficiency	and	effectiveness	crucially	depend	on	
the	 industry/sector	where	 it	 is	applied,	how	the	flexibility	
which	is	present	in	the	legal	system	can	be	used	to	concur	
with	innovation	and	sector	specificities,	and	to	what	extent	
the	general	framework	of	incentives	(which	also	concerns	
the	patent	office)	may	be	improved	so	as	to	minimize	mis-
use	and	abuse	of	the	system	by	various	parties.
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